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Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis triggered a revision of the VaR based Basel II market risk 
framework to address extreme events. The revised VaR methodology remains unchanged 
under Basel III, however ongoing studies to evaluate VaR continue in academia and by the 
Basel Committee. In this paper, we assess VaR models for Australian banks over the past ten 
years and provide statistical evidence of their effectiveness. Results indicate that one year 
parametric and historical models produce better measures of VaR than models with longer 
time frames.  VaR estimates produced using Monte Carlo simulations show very low 
percentage of violations but higher level of violations.  VaR estimates produced by the 
ARMA GARCH model show relatively high percentage of violations, however, the level of 
violations is quite low. Our findings shed light on the rationale and design of the revised 
Basel II VaR methodology which has also been adopted under Basel III. 
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1. Introduction 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a risk measurement methodology that demonstrates the worst loss 
over a predetermined time horizon that will not be exceeded with a given level of confidence.  
See Jorion (2007) and Alexander (2008) for further explanation of the VaR measure.  It 
allows the user to make a statement such as: this VaR figure is the maximum expected loss, 
with 99% confidence, in any one day. A VaR measurement is based on the examination of the 
percentiles of the distribution, summarising the downside risk of an institution due to 
financial market variables.  This results in a single figure that is easy to interpret.  VaR has a 
wide range of applications such as risk management and the determination of capital 
adequacy requirements.  
Despite the apparent advantages of the ease of use of the VaR measurement it has been 
criticised in the literature and in practice predominantly due to unexpected extreme events 
which cause the distribution of asset returns to exhibit “fat tails”.  Li (2011) demonstrates 
concerns expressed by practitioners in regard to fat tails as revealed in interviews with bank 
risk managers relating to Basel II. Another apparent shortcoming of VaR is that it focuses on 
the probability of a loss, regardless of the magnitude of the violations when they do occur 
(see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) and Szegö (2002)). As 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) demonstrated, although the violations of VaR in their dataset 
are infrequent, the magnitudes are surprisingly large.   
The literature postulates new methodologies for calculating VaR. For example, Wang and 
Cheng (2011) propose a new methodology specifically designed to examine tail risk.  
Gaglianone et al (2011) also propose a new methodology for estimating VaR to identify 
periods of increased risk exposure. As demonstrated in Li (2011), many practitioners also 
resort to other methods such as stress testing, Conditional VaR (CVaR) and Extreme Value 
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Theory (EVT) as complementary approaches.  However, the models that have persisted in the 
literature are the parametric approach, the historical approach and Monte Carlo simulations. 
In Australia, Allen and Powell (2007) attempt to explain market risk at the industry level 
using VaR measures. Allen and Powell (2009a) examine the conditional credit VaR 
methodology. The authors then use this methodology to allow banks to incorporate industry 
risk using the relationship between market and credit risk.  Allen and Powell (2009b) use the 
conditional credit VaR methodology to examine market value at risk from an Australian 
sectoral perspective. Allen, Singh, and Powell (2012) present a comparative analysis of 
conditional autoregressive VaR models with other volatility models such as GARCH (1,1).  
Much of the literature on VaR focuses on US and European commercial banks, see for 
example Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), Cuoco and Liu (2006), Lucas (2001), Fiori and 
Iannotti, (2007), Perignon, Deng and Wang (2008) and Perignon and Smith (2010a and b), 
Berkowitz, Christoffersen and Pelletier (2011) to name a few.  This is expected given the 
importance of the VaR calculation for commercial banks under the Basel Accords. Berkowitz 
and O’Brien (2002) provide a particularly interesting insight into VaR calculations using 
proprietary profit and loss information of six large US banks.  They use a 99 percent 
historical model and compare this with an ARMA GARCH model. Results of this research 
show that the ARMA GARCH model is better able to adjust to changes in volatility.  
More recently, studies have begun to show that there can be significant variation in results 
using different approaches to calculating VaR.  For example, Kim et al (2011) compare 
backtests of VaR ARMA GARCH models and produce similar results with Berkowitz and 
O’Brien (2002). In addition, Da Veiga, Chan and McAleer (2011) show different 
performances of five volatility models used to forecast VaR thresholds.   
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This paper assesses and compares a number of different measurement approaches including 
parametric, historical, Monte Carlo simulations and ARMA GARCH to examine the returns 
of the nine largest banks in Australia.  The period covered includes the Global Financial 
Crisis, during which time widespread VaR measures were highly criticised.   
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic types of VaR models, Section 
3 describes the application of VaR measurement to the Basel II and III Accords, Section 4 
provides a discussion of the data and methodology and the results are presented in Section 5.  
Section 6 provides a summary. 
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2. Theoretical Assessment of the Basic Types of VaR Models 
VaR models may be categorised into four groups of analytic techniques
1
. First, the parametric 
approach calculates the historical standard deviation and then scales the appropriate factors; 
secondly, the historical approach directly reads the quantile from the historical distribution; 
thirdly, Monte Carlo simulation estimates VaR from repeatedly simulated prices or returns of 
the financial instrument and fourthly the ARMA GARCH model is used to estimate the mean 
and variance of the distribution which can then be used to estimate the VaR.  
Parametric VaR models, in contrast to the nonparametric category, attempt to fit a parametric 
distribution such as a normal distribution to the data. Specifically, the models are applied to 
portfolios assuming that returns are independent and identically distributed with a normal 
distribution including portfolios of cash, futures and/or forward positions on commodities, 
bonds, loans, swaps
2
, equities and foreign exchange (Alexander, 2008). 
The historical method uses the empirical quantile of the historical distribution of return series 
in a very direct way as a guide to what might happen in the future. The main advantage of the 
historical method is that it makes no assumptions about risk factor changes being from a 
particular distribution. By relying on actual prices, this method allows nonlinearities and non-
normal distributions. It does not rely on specific assumptions about valuation models or the 
underlying stochastic structure of the market. The historical method is therefore able to 
                                                          
1
 According to Li (2011) in practice the choice of VaR method is a function of the nature of the portfolio. For 
fixed income and equity, parametric approach is assumed to be adequate. If there are more exotic options, a 
more advanced full revaluation method such as historical or Monte Carlo simulation is required.  
2
 Between the value of a bond (or swaps) portfolio and interest rates, there is a non-linear relationship but it has 
already been captured by the sensitivities to the risk factors that are in present value of basis point terms. 
Because the discount factor in present value of basis point terms is a linear function of the interest rate, 
parametric VaR models can be applied for such portfolios, as suggested by Alexander (2008). 
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reliably predict the VaR as shown by Winker and Maringer (2007), but they also find a 
substantial amount of hidden risk when it is used for a risk constraint in portfolio 
optimisation.  
Monte Carlo simulation is a flexible and powerful methodology that has numerous 
applications to finance including VaR estimation. It is a process of repeatedly simulating the 
prices or returns of financial instruments or portfolios, to be confident that the simulated 
distribution of portfolio values is sufficiently close to the ‘true’ distribution of actual portfolio 
values, which is used as a reliable proxy. VaR then can be estimated from this proxy 
distribution (see Alexander, 2008, Jorion, 2007 and Dowd, 2005). However, its 
computational time is a major drawback, consequently it is often too expensive to implement 
on a frequent basis.  Also, the potential of model risk cannot be ignored, because Monte 
Carlo relies on specific stochastic processes for the underlying risk factors as well as the 
pricing model for securities such as options or mortgages. For further details see Jorion 
(2007).  
With ARMA and GARCH methodology, an ARMA model is used to estimate the mean of 
the distribution and a GARCH model is used to calculate the volatility of the distribution.  
These parameters are then used as inputs in the VaR calculation.  ARMA methodology is 
frequently used in forecasting time series models with considerable accuracy, particularly in 
the short term.  ARMA combines two different specifications into one equation, an 
autoregressive (AR) process and a moving average (MA) process.  The AR process includes 
past values of the dependent variable while the MA process includes past error terms. Hence 
an ARMA (1,1) process includes only the most recent past values of the dependent variable 
and the most recent error term in the regression equation. The GARCH methodology of 
Bollerslev (1986) is an adaptation of the Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
model (ARCH) (Engle, 1982) known as the Generalised ARCH model.  As discussed in 
7 
 
Vlaar (2000) and Sjölander (2009) GARCH modelling is used to model the time varying 
volatility of financial assets, which in practice is possible to limit the number of lagged 
squared disturbance terms and conditional variances to one, resulting in a GARCH(1,1) 
model.  
3. VaR application in Basel II and III 
In the field of prudential supervision, VaR has been embraced as the fundamental market risk 
measurement methodology to calculate regulatory capital under the Basel Accords. Basel II 
in particular promotes further application and dramatic development of VaR models. The 
Basel Committee suggests calculating VaR on a daily basis at the 99 percent level with a one 
tailed confidence interval; the historical observation period is “constrained to be a minimum 
length of one year” (BCBS, 2006).  
Banks are required to ensure that their internal models have been adequately validated by 
conducting regular backtesting over the recent 250 days under Basel II. Described as a 
procedure of ‘reality checks’ by Jorion (2007), backtesting tests whether realised (current) 
exposures are consistent with the shortcut method prediction over all margin periods within 
one year (BCBS, 2006), to prove the model validation to supervisors. If the actual loss 
occurred on a day is greater than the VaR estimation for that day, an “exception” is recorded.  
The Basel Committee requires banks to meet minimum capital requirement for their market 
risk exposures based on VaR estimations, multiplied by a multiplication factor. The 
multiplication factor is set on the basis of banks’ model validation assessment—VaR 
backtesting. If the number of exceptions from VaR backtesting during the previous 250 days 
is less than 5 which falls in “green zone”, multiplication factor k is normally set equal to 3. If 
number of exceptions is 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 which fall in “yellow zone”; the multiplication factor 
is set equal to 3.4, 3.5, 3.65, 3.75, and 3.85 respectively. A multiplication factor of 4 is set for 
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the “red zone” in which the number of exceptions equals to 10 or more (BCBS, 2006). As 
specified in the Basel II Accord (BCBS, 2006), the green zone corresponds to backtesting 
results that do not themselves suggest a problem with the quality or accuracy of a bank’s VaR 
models; the yellow zone encompasses results that do raise questions on models’ quality or 
accuracy; the red zone indicates a problem with a bank’s VaR models according to 
backtesting result.  
The empirical effectiveness of VaR models based on the above criterion has been evaluated 
in the literature. Brummelhuis and Kaufmann (2007) evaluate the time scaling of VaR 
estimations using the square-root-of-time rule as specified in Basel II. Sjölander (2009) 
compares VaR models with shorter estimation periods with the 1 year minimum estimation 
period required by Basel II. Gürtler, Hibbeln and Vöhringer (2010) compare VaR and 
expected shortfall models in relation to their suitability in assessing the concentration of the 
risk of credit portfolios according to the Basel II requirements.  
Research on the empirical performance of VaR measures also includes those that evaluate the 
validity requirements in Basel II, such as Kerkholf and Melenberg (2004), Kerkholf, 
Melenberg and Schumacher (2010), Kaplanski and Levy (2007), De la Pena, Rivera and 
Ruiz-Mata (2006), Dowd (2006) and Hurlin and  Tokpavi (2006). These studies analyse the 
range of the backtesting penalty structures (as described above) with multiplication factors.  
Studies on VaR models published before the Global Financial Crisis, such as Alexander and 
Baptista (2006) warn that the use of VaR under Basel II may increase financial market 
fragility. They suggest that certain banks will end up selecting riskier portfolios when a VaR 
constraint is imposed under the Basel Accords. They suggest that inaccurate risk assessments 
based on VaR may lead to excessive risk exposures and capital charges that are consequently 
not sufficient to absorb the losses.  
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The Global Financial Crisis triggered a revision of Basel II’s VaR based market risk 
framework to address extreme events. The Basel Committee set up some more restrictive 
requirements in the revision, however the VaR methodology itself remains unchanged in the 
Basel II revision. This means the features and parameters of VaR methodologies as described 
above, haven’t been changed under the Basel II revision. In accordance with the Basel III 
structure, the Basel Committee has kept the VaR methodology intact while the reviewing 
continues (BCBS, 2011).  
The number of ongoing studies testing VaR models has increased following the Global 
Financial Crisis, due to the repercussions for financial institutions that miscalculated risk 
exposures.  For example, Kim et al (2011) backtest VaR models based on different 
distributional assumptions during Global Financial Crisis and investigate the difference 
between VaR values for non-normal models compared to normal models including ARMA 
GARCH models. Pesaran and Pesaran (2010) examine asset return correlations during the 
Global Financial Crisis and the ability of VaR models to characterise market risk.  Zhao et al 
(2010) introduce a new approach for estimating VaR, which is then used to show the 
likelihood of the impacts of the current financial crisis.  Obi, Sil and Jeong-Gil (2010) 
examine the market risk exposure of investments in the South African stock market during 
the Global Financial Crisis using VaR as a measure of market risk.  McAleer, Jiménez-Martín 
and Pérez-Amaral (2012) investigate the performance of a variety of single and combined 
VaR forecasts in terms of daily capital requirements and violation penalties under Basel II.  
They present evidence to support the claim that the median point forecast of VaR is generally 
robust to events such as the Global Financial Crisis.  
Under Basel II, its revision and Basel III, the VaR methodology itself has been continuously 
applied either for supervisory purposes or for banks’ internal risk management without major 
amendments. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of VaR 
10 
 
models using Australian bank data, given that the Australian banking sector performed 
relatively well during the Global Financial Crisis having implemented Basel II principles at 
an early stage. 
4. Data and Methodology 
The daily share prices for the largest nine banks in Australia by market capitalisation were 
collected from Datastream for the full time period available for each bank up to 30 June 
2011.  Comparative analysis includes data for the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2011. 
Table 1 provides return statistics for each of the banks over the full history for each bank. 
Consistent with the approach by Gupta and Liang (2005), we have applied VaR methodology 
to daily share price returns. This approach circumvents several problems in calculating VaR 
including the proprietary nature of profit and loss information, the complex portfolio 
structure of major banks and the inclusion of non-linear assets such as options and interest 
rate derivatives commonly held by large commercial banks. 
The approach in this study also follows the workings of Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), 
which focuses on bank VaR estimates using a parametric model with 99 percent confidence, 
consistent with the Basel II and III requirements. In this study we also use a 1 year, 3 year, 5 
year, 7 year and 10 year time frame to determine the parameters of μ and σ, where: 
VaR = μ – 2.33σ 
for a 99 percent parametric model and 
μ = the mean of the daily share price returns 
σ = the standard deviation of the daily share price returns. 
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In this study we also use the historical approach to calculate VaR.  Using this approach we 
calculate the lowest 1 percentile loss in daily returns.  A 1 year, 3 year, 5 year, 7 year and 10 
year time frame is again used to calculate the VaR. 
Monte Carlo simulations are used to generate share returns using formula provided in Boyle 
(1977), namely: 
St+1 = St exp [r - 
2
/2 +  x~ ] 
where:  
St = the current stock price at time t 
r = the risk free rate of return 
2 = the variance of the stock price returns 
x~  = a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance. 
In addition, the antithetic variate method, as described in Boyle (1977), is used as a variance 
reduction technique to reduce simulation error. Five thousand simulated pathways are derived 
for the bank share prices, followed by 5000 simulated pathways where the random numbers 
generated are the negative of the first 5000 random numbers.  The returns generated using the 
Monte Carlo simulations are then used to estimate VaR. 
We also use an ARMA(1,1) plus GARCH(1,1) model of share returns as an alternative VaR 
model as suggested by Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002). The reduced form model of rt is 
estimated by: 
rt = μ + ρ rt-1 + ut + λut-1      (1) 
where ut is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and variance σt. The volatility process σt is 
described by 
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σt = ω + u
2
t-1 + φt-1     (2) 
where ω,  and φ are parameters to be estimated.  We apply the standard GARCH model 
where innovations are assumed to be conditionally Normal. Thus the 99 percent VaR forecast 
at time t is given by ŕt+1 – 2.33ờ t+1, where ŕt+1 is the predicted value of rt+1 from equation (1) 
and ờ t+1 is the estimated volatility from equation (2). 
Assessment of each of the models is conducted out of sample.  Therefore, there are no 
forecasts for the first 260 days, with forecasts thereafter using only information that would 
have been available on that day to calculate VaR.  VaR estimates are calculated every day 
thereafter.  The sample size is different for each of the banks due to the availability of 
historical share prices.  This process forms the basis for our model validation. 
As described in Dowd (2005), model validation involves applying statistical methods to 
determine whether the forecasts of a VaR model are consistent with the model assumptions.  
This process may also be used to compare different models that may be used for VaR 
forecasts. Model validation is considered vital to making a judgement on the performance of 
risk models. Hence this approach is adopted in this paper in two ways. Firstly, the bank’s 
share returns are examined to assess the normality or otherwise of the distribution.  Second, 
model validation is used to compare the parametric, historical, Monte Carlo simulation and 
ARMA GARCH models. This process of out of sample forecast evaluation is also known as 
backtesting. As explained in Alexander (2008) failure of a backtest indicates VaR model 
misspecification and/or large estimation errors.   
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5. Results 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 for each of the nine banks daily share price returns 
representing the profits and losses for these banks.  The length of time varies from 3403 
trading days to 30 June 2011 to 10,043 trading days to 30 June 2011. Table 1 shows that eight 
of the nine banks had a positive average return since the bank was listed, with a minimum 
daily return of -35.85% and a maximum daily return of 37.81%.  The highest standard 
deviation was 2.26% and the lowest standard deviation was 1.34%. 
 
Table 1 – Bank Daily Return Summary Statistics 
 
 
Histograms of the daily share price returns are presented in Figure 1.  These figures also 
incorporate the measures of kurtosis and skewness as shown in Table 1.  The kurtosis and 
skewness estimates (relative to the Normal distribution) displayed in column 4 and 5 appear 
to be quite large.  This is reflected in the histograms of daily share price returns and is 
consistent with previous research such as that by Lucas (2001) and Cuoco and Liu (2006).   
 
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 99th Percentile
Bank 1 10,043         0.03% 1.54% 10.93 -44.40% -23.80% 14.21% -4.10%
Bank 2 5,509           0.05% 1.67% 15.92 -47.85% -25.53% 12.12% -4.36%
Bank 3 10,043         0.04% 1.59% 10.99 -28.74% -18.87% 17.35% -4.39%
Bank 4 5,164           0.05% 1.34% 6.06 10.63% -9.09% 12.51% -3.82%
Bank 5 3,403           -0.01% 1.97% 40.64 -126.69% -35.85% 23.31% -4.86%
Bank 6 9,103           0.05% 1.57% 6.59 19.86% -13.14% 15.11% -4.11%
Bank 7 6,002           0.04% 1.55% 12.33 15.41% -18.11% 17.89% -4.22%
Bank 8 4,800           0.04% 1.76% 21.89 140.78% -10.57% 29.06% -4.50%
Bank 9 3,893           0.07% 2.26% 29.73 104.10% -23.22% 37.81% -6.09%
Average 6,440           0.04% 1.69% 17.23 4.79% -19.80% 19.93% -4.49%
Bank Daily Return Summary Statistics
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Figure 1 – Bank Daily Return Distribution 
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Table 2 – Summary of Bank 99% 1 Year VaR Parametric Models 
 
 
Table 2 provides the results of the analysis of a 99% 1 year VaR parametric model.  It shows 
that the losses are occurring about 1.78 of every 100 days for these large commercial 
Australian banks.  This appears to be a high number of violations as we would expect 1 
violation in every 100 days. However, this result is consistent with prior literature such as 
Pérignon, Deng and Wang (2008) and Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) which shows that VaR 
estimates are higher than expected and higher than proves to be the case. These research 
papers postulate an understatement of the diversification benefits achieved by banks investing 
in a wide range of assets.  However, Pérignon and Smith (2010 a and b) further investigate 
the reasons behind the high VaR estimates and shows that the diversification benefits are not 
understated by the banks.  In addition, as discussed in section 4, this result of 1.78 violations 
in every 100 days would be considered to be in the green zone under the Basel methodology.  
This methodology suggests that a model is in the “green zone”, acceptable level, if the 
number of exceptions from VaR backtesting during the previous 250 days is less than 5. Our 
results fall in this category. 
Column 6 of Table 2 shows that when a loss does occur it is on average 1.35% below the 
estimated VaR.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a graphical representation of this information.  
Observations Mean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Bank 1 9782 -3.42% 171 1.75% -1.29% 0.0000
Bank 2 5249 -3.56% 99 1.89% -1.18% 0.0000
Bank 3 9782 -3.43% 164 1.68% -1.64% 0.0000
Bank 4 4903 -2.91% 86 1.75% -1.09% 0.0000
Bank 5 3142 -4.37% 65 2.07% -1.67% 0.0000
Bank 6 8842 -3.45% 169 1.91% -1.12% 0.0000
Bank 7 5741 -3.40% 99 1.72% -1.23% 0.0000
Bank 8 4539 -3.89% 75 1.65% -0.93% 0.0000
Bank 9 3631 -4.67% 57 1.57% -2.04% 0.0003
Average 6179 -3.68% 109 1.78% -1.35%
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Figure 2 shows the daily returns for each of the banks along with the VaR estimate for each 
day.  Figure 3 isolates each violation of VaR. These figures show the timing of each of the 
violations of VaR and the magnitude of each violation.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the 
largest violation was for bank 5, which experienced a violation of VaR by approximately 
30% in June 2003.  This event clearly influenced the kurtosis and skewness estimates for 
bank 5 as shown in Table 1. The Kupiec test in column 7 of Table 2 attempts to determine 
whether the observed number of violations of the model is consistent with the expected 
number of violations for a given probably as described in Kupiec (1995).  The null hypothesis 
is that the model is correct and with such low p values we can reject this null hypothesis for 
each of the banks using this test.  
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Figure 2 – Bank Daily VaR Models
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Figure 3 – Bank Daily 99% VaR Violations 
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-18%
-16%
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
Bank 7
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Table 3 provides a comparison of parametric VaR models using different lengths of time to 
estimate μ and σ.  Column 5 shows that 1 year model has the lowest % of violations and 
column 6 shows that the 1 year model also has the lowest mean violation when such an event 
occurs. However, it is likely that our results are influence by events at the time of the Global 
Financial Crisis.  During this time large and expected negative returns occurred. Models with 
longer time horizons took longer to incorporate this new information.  However, the models 
with a shorter time horizon were faster to respond to the changing economic conditions 
incorporating larger VaR’s, as shown in column 3 of Table 3. Using the Kupiec test we can 
reject the null hypothesis that this is the correct model for each of the banks using the 
parametric VaR model. 
 
Table 3 – Comparison of Parametric Bank VaR Models 
 
 
 
Table 4 provides an analysis of a 99% 1 year VaR historical model.  It shows that the losses 
are occurring 1.47 in every 100 days for each these large commercial Australian banks.  
Column 3 of Table 4 shows that that the average VaR for the banks is -3.92% which is more 
negative than that of the equivalent parametric model in Table 2. Column 5 of Table 4 shows 
Observations Mean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Average 1 Yr 6179 -3.68% 109 1.78% -1.35% 0.0000
Average 2 Yr 5921 -3.75% 108 1.85% -1.42% 0.0000
Average 3 Yr 5655 -3.76% 112 2.04% -1.49% 0.0000
Average 4 Yr 5386 -3.71% 114 2.20% -1.53% 0.0000
Average 5 Yr 5128 -3.79% 100 2.11% -1.52% 0.0000
Average 6 Yr 4868 -3.76% 94 2.11% -1.55% 0.0000
Average 7 Yr 4614 -3.64% 103 2.36% -1.52% 0.0000
Average 8 Yr 4355 -3.76% 90 2.38% -1.62% 0.0000
Average 9 Yr 4092 -3.66% 98 2.75% -1.55% 0.0000
Average 10 Yr 3824 -3.69% 93 2.84% -1.59% 0.0000
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that there was an average of 1.47% violations which is lower than the parametric model 
however, it is still above the expected 1% or 1 in 100 days.  Column 6 of Table 4 shows that 
when a loss does occur it is on average 1.41% below the estimated VaR, only slightly higher 
than that of the parametric model. Using the Kupiec test we can reject the null hypothesis that 
this is the correct model for 8 of the 9 banks at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4 – Summary of Bank 99% 1 Year VaR Historical Models 
 
 
Table 5 provides a comparison of historical VaR models using different lengths of time.  
Column 5 again shows that 1 year model has the lowest % of violations and column 6 shows 
that the 1 year model also has the lowest mean violation when such an event occurs. This is 
consistent with Table 3 and is likely to be influence by the Global Financial Crisis.  However, 
this table also shows that the lower level of violations is able to be achieved without larger 
VaR estimates.  This suggests that by adapting more quickly to the economic conditions 
lower levels of violations can occur by raising the VaR estimates when conditions are good 
and lowering VaR estimates when conditions are poor. Using the Kupiec test we can reject 
the null hypothesis that this is the correct model for each of the banks at the 1% level. 
ObservationsMean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Bank 1 9782 -3.77% 136 1.39% -1.35% 0.0000
Bank 2 5249 -3.82% 75 1.43% -1.41% 0.0006
Bank 3 9782 -3.88% 130 1.33% -1.81% 0.0003
Bank 4 4903 -3.12% 71 1.45% -0.98% 0.0006
Bank 5 3142 -4.54% 56 1.78% -1.64% 0.0000
Bank 6 8842 -3.77% 136 1.54% -1.13% 0.0000
Bank 7 5741 -3.63% 89 1.55% -1.19% 0.0000
Bank 8 4539 -3.96% 67 1.48% -1.01% 0.0005
Bank 9 3631 -4.78% 46 1.27% -2.18% 0.0177
Average 6179 -3.92% 90 1.47% -1.41%
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Table 5 – Comparison of Historical Bank VaR Models 
 
 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) suggest that high correlations across banks may be a potential 
concern to bank supervisors because it raises the spectre of systematic risk, that is, the 
simultaneous realisation of large losses at several banks.  Table 6 shows the correlations 
between the nine Australian bank’s daily share price returns and their VaR estimates, with t-
statistics shown in parentheses.  Panel A of Table 6 shows that the correlations between the 
bank’s daily share price returns are all positive but generally quite low, ranging from 0.35 to 
0.74 with an average of 0.49.  The associated t statistics are shown in parenthesis.  None of 
the correlations are significant at the 10% level.  This is consistent with the finding of 
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) suggesting that this reflects some differences in portfolio 
compositions among banks.  Panel B of Table 6 shows the correlations for daily VaR across 
the nine banks.  The correlations are consistently positive and relatively high, ranging from 
0.38 to 1.00 with an average of 0.85.  All correlations are significant at the 1% level.  These 
correlations show the similarities in bank VaR’s in Figure 2 and are consistent with the 
positive correlations of the daily share price return between the nine banks.  
 
Observations Mean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Average 1 Yr 6179 -3.92% 90 1.47% -1.41% 0.0002    
Average 2 Yr 5921 -4.10% 78 1.33% -1.53% 0.0029    
Average 3 Yr 5655 -4.19% 78 1.42% -1.58% 0.0016    
Average 4 Yr 5386 -4.18% 76 1.50% -1.58% 0.0008    
Average 5 Yr 5128 -4.19% 72 1.47% -1.55% 0.0016    
Average 6 Yr 4868 -4.16% 70 1.51% -1.56% 0.0008    
Average 7 Yr 4614 -4.17% 67 1.57% -1.61% 0.0011    
Average 8 Yr 4355 -4.20% 66 1.69% -1.65% 0.0005    
Average 9 Yr 4092 -4.23% 65 1.87% -1.62% 0.0002    
Average 10 Yr 3824 -4.27% 62 1.97% -1.65% 0.0001    
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Table 6 – Correlations of Bank Returns and VaR across Individual Banks 
 
 
Table 7 demonstrates the VaR estimates produced by the model using Monte Carlo 
simulations.  Column 5 shows an average percentage of violations that would be expected 
under a 99% model at 0.97%. This is lower than both the parametric model and historical 
model which had an average percentage violation of 1.78% and 1.47% respectively over the 
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8 Bank 9
Bank 1 1.00
Bank 2 0.51 1.00
(-48.82)
Bank 3 0.64 0.47 1.00
(-25.06) (41.00)
Bank 4 0.71 0.47 0.68 1.00
(31.61) (62.43) (49.44)
Bank 5 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.42 1.00
(-38.96) (-11.95) (-27.03) (-43.05)
Bank 6 0.73 0.47 0.70 0.68 0.42 1.00
(-21.26) (59.94) (16.11) (-47.3) (31.34)
Bank 7 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.35 0.47 1.00
(-59.67) (7.41) (-31.02) (-73.49) (15.26) (-42.48)
Bank 8 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.35 0.44 0.44 1.00
(-44.41) (-6.59) (-31.89) (-52.4) (7.54) (-37.11) (-17.04)
Bank 9 0.48 0.47 0.56 0.49 0.43 0.54 0.41 0.43 1.00
(-55.81) (-45.53) (-56.06) (-60.75) (-10.51) (-62.26) (-36.4) (-26.92)
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8 Bank 9
Bank 1 1.00
Bank 2 0.97 1.00
(-0.87)
Bank 3 0.97 0.96 1.00
(-0.96) (0.11)
Bank 4 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00
(-0.06) (0.82) (0.98)
Bank 5 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.57 1.00
(-1.28) (-0.46) (-0.6) (-1.27)
Bank 6 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.58 1.00
(-0.13) (0.74) (0.91) (-0.07) (1.18)
Bank 7 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.42 0.95 1.00
(-0.09) (0.66) (0.66) (-0.05) (1.09) (0.00)
Bank 8 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.38 0.84 0.90 1.00
(0.04) (0.76) (0.73) (0.08) (1.16) (0.12) (0.12)
Bank 9 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.52 0.97 0.96 0.90 1.00
(-0.09) (0.58) (0.54) (-0.06) (0.95) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.12)
Panel A: Return Correlation Coefficients
Panel B: VaR Correlation Coefficients
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same period.  Column 3 shows that this was at least partly due to a lower VaR estimate. The 
VaR estimate for Monte Carlo simulations was -4.70% compared with -3.68% (-3.92%) for 
the parametric (historical) models.  Column 5 shows that the Monte Carlo simulation model 
has the highest level of violations at -1.63% compared with the parametric (-1.35%) and 
historical (-1.41%) models.  This demonstrates that even though the Monte Carlo Simulation 
model is a more sophisticated method of calculating VaR it does not necessarily provide 
better estimates for Australian banks. Using the Kupiec test we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that this is the correct model for 7 of the 9 banks at the 1% level. 
 
Table 7 – Backtests of Monte Carlo Simulation VaR Model 
 
 
Table 8 demonstrates the VaR estimates produced by the ARMA GARCH model.  Consistent 
with the other methodologies tested, column 5 shows an average percentage of violations 
higher than would be expected under a 99% model at 1.79%. This is similar to the percentage 
of violations by the parametric model at 1.78% over the same period.  Column 3 shows that 
the higher level of violations occurred even though this model produced a lower VaR 
estimate. The VaR estimate for the ARMA GARCH model was -3.59% compared with 
-4.70% for the Monte Carlo simulations, -3.68% for the parametric model and -3.92% for the 
Observations Mean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Bank 1 9522 -4.43% 76 0.80% -1.54% 0.0056
Bank 2 5247 -4.53% 54 1.03% -1.64% 0.0533
Bank 3 9522 -4.44% 91 0.96% -1.80% 0.0381
Bank 4 4902 -3.68% 57 1.16% -1.21% 0.0285
Bank 5 3141 -5.61% 37 1.18% -2.36% 0.0409
Bank 6 8841 -4.48% 79 0.89% -1.38% 0.0267
Bank 7 5731 -4.34% 53 0.92% -1.42% 0.0465
Bank 8 4538 -4.93% 22 0.48% -1.23% 0.0000
Bank 9 3631 -5.85% 48 1.32% -2.08% 0.0103
Average 6119 -4.70% 57 0.97% -1.63%
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historical method.  Column 6 shows that the ARMA GARCH model has the lowest level of 
violations at -1.15% compared with the parametric (-1.35%), historical (-1.41%) and Monte 
Carlo simulation (-1.63%) models.  This demonstrates that the sophisticated methodology of 
the ARMA GARCH model produces a relatively large number of violations, however the 
level of violations are relatively low. This result was achieved through relatively low levels 
of VaR. Using the Kupiec test we can reject the null hypothesis that this is the correct model 
for each of the banks at the 1% level. 
 
Table 8 – Backtests of ARMA(1,1) + GARCH(1,1) VaR Model 
 
 
Overall, the ARMA GARCH model appears to offer the best results when compared with 
parametric, historical and Monte Carlo simulation models. The ARMA GARCH model 
demonstrates a relatively low violation level when such an event occurs, which appears to be 
achieved without estimating lower levels of VaR.   
 
 
 
Observations Mean VaR Number of Violations % of Volations Mean Violation Kupiec
Bank 1 9783 -3.35% 164 1.68% -1.11% 0.0000
Bank 2 5249 -3.55% 89 1.70% -1.18% 0.0000
Bank 3 9783 -3.31% 194 1.98% -1.14% 0.0000
Bank 4 4904 -2.84% 88 1.79% -0.78% 0.0000
Bank 5 3143 -4.35% 61 1.94% -1.67% 0.0000
Bank 6 8843 -3.39% 165 1.87% -0.98% 0.0000
Bank 7 5742 -3.31% 99 1.72% -1.09% 0.0000
Bank 8 4540 -3.84% 81 1.78% -0.82% 0.0000
Bank 9 3633 -4.40% 60 1.65% -1.59% 0.0001
Average 6180 -3.59% 111 1.79% -1.15%
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6. Conclusion 
Eight of the nine commercial Australian banks included in this study experienced a positive 
average return since the bank was listed, with a minimum daily return of -35.85% and a 
maximum daily return of 37.81%.  The highest standard deviation was 2.26% and the lowest 
standard deviation was 1.34%.  Histograms of the daily share price returns show that the 
kurtosis and skewness estimates (relative to the Normal distribution) appear to be quite large.  
This is consistent with previous research such as that by (Lucas, 2001 and Cuoco and Liu, 
2006).   
An analysis of a 99% 1 year VaR parametric model shows that losses are occurring about 
1.78 of every 100 days for each these 9 large commercial Australian banks.  When a loss 
does occur it is on average 1.35% below the estimated VaR.  The largest violation of VaR 
was by approximately 25% in June 2003.  This event clearly influenced the kurtosis and 
skewness estimates for the return distribution of this bank. 
A comparison of parametric VaR models using different lengths of time to estimate μ and σ 
shows that the 1 year model has the lowest percentage of violations and the lowest mean 
violation when such an event occurs. It is likely that the results are influence by events at the 
time of the Global Financial Crisis.  During this time large and unexpected negative returns 
occurred. Models with longer time horizons took longer to incorporate this new information.  
However, models with a shorter time horizon were faster to respond to the changing 
economic conditions incorporating larger VaR’s.  This is consistent with the findings using 
historical VaR models.  However, the lower level of violations is able to be achieved without 
lower overall VaR estimates.  This suggests that by adapting more quickly to the economic 
conditions lower levels of violations can occur by raising the VaR estimates when conditions 
are good and lowering VaR estimates when conditions are poor. 
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Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) suggest that high correlations across banks may be a potential 
concern to bank supervisors because it raises the spectre of systematic risk, that is, the 
simultaneous realisation of large losses at several banks.  We show that the correlations 
between the 9 Australian bank’s daily share price returns are all positive but generally quite 
low.  The consistently positive and relatively high correlations in bank VaR’s are consistent 
with the positive correlations of the daily share price return between the banks. The VaR 
estimates produced by the model using Monte Carlo simulations show a very low percentage 
of violations but with a higher level of violations that occur.  The VaR estimates produced by 
the ARMA GARCH model also shows a relatively high percentage of violations, however, 
the level of violations is quite low.   
Our research findings offer direct statistical evidence on the accuracy of historical, 
parametric, Monte Carlo and ARMA GARCH models. The results support the VaR 
methodology adopted under the Basel II revision and the forthcoming Basel III proposal. This 
information is relevant in relation to the banking sector for further policy making purpose and 
the design of internal models.  
27 
 
7. References 
Alexander, C. 2008, Value-at-risk models: market risk analysis, Volume IV, England, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd.  
Alexander, G., & Baptista, A. 2006, Does the Basel Capital Accord reduce bank fragility? An 
assessment of the value-at-risk approach, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(7), pp. 
1631-1660. 
Allen, D. & Powell, R. 2007, Industry Market Value at Risk in Australia, FEMARC Working 
Paper Series 0704, Edith Cowan University. 
- 2009a, Transitional credit modelling and its relationship to market value at risk: an 
Australian sectoral perspective, Accounting & Finance, 49 (3), pp. 425-44. 
- 2009b, Structural Credit Modelling and its Relationship to Market Value at Risk: An 
Australian Sectoral Perspective. In G. N. Gregoriou (Ed.), The VaR Implementation 
Handbook (pp. 403-414). New York: McGraw Hill. 
Allen, D., Singh, A. & Powell, R. 2012, A gourmet’s delight. CAViaR and the Australian 
stock market, Applied Economic Letters, 19 (15), pp. 1493-1498.  
Basak, S. & Shapiro, A. 2001, Value-at-Risk-Based Risk Management: Optimal Policies and 
Asset Price, The Review of Financial Studies, 14 (2), 371-450. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, Basel II: International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards—A Revised Framework, Bank for 
International Settlements. 
-  2011, Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking system, Bank for International Settlements. 
Berkowitz, J. & O’Brien, J. 2002, How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at Commercial 
Banks, The Journal of Finance, 57 (3), 1093-1111. 
28 
 
Berkowitz, J., Christoffersen, P. & Pelletier, D. 2011, Evaluating Value-at-Risk Models with 
Desk-Level Data, Management Science, 15 (12), pp.2213-2227. 
Bollerslev, T. 1986, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity, Journal of 
Econometrics, 31, pp. 307-327. 
Boyle, P. 1977, Options: A Monte Carlo Approach, Journal of Financial Economics, 4 (3), 
pp. 323-338. 
Brummelhuis, R. & Kaufmann, R. 2007. Time-scaling of value-at-risk in GARCH(1,1) and 
AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) processes, The Journal of Risk, 9(4), 39-94. 
Cuoco, D. & Liu, H. 2006, An analysis of VaR-based capital requirements, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 15 (3), pp. 362-394. 
Da Veiga, B., Chan, F. & McAleer, M. 2011, It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel 
Accord Penalties in Encouraging Risk Management, Accounting & Finance, 52(1), 
95-116. 
De la Pena, H., Rivera, R. & Ruiz-Mata, J. 2006, Quality control of risk measures: 
backtesting VAR models, The Journal of Risk, 9(2), 39-54. 
 Dowd, K. 2005, Measuring market risk, 2
nd
 edition, England, John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
- 2006, Backtesting market risk models in a standard normality framework. The Journal 
of Risk, 9(2), 93-111. 
Engle, R. 1982, Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of Variance of 
United Kingdom Inflation, Econometrica, 50, pp. 987-1008. 
Fiori, R. & Iannotti, S. 2007, Scenario-based principal component value-at-risk when the 
underlying risk factors are skewed and heavy-tailed: an application to Italian banks' 
interest rate risk exposure, The Journal of Risk, 9(3), 63-99. 
Gaglianone, W., Lima L., Linton, O. & Smith, D. 2011, Evaluating value-at-risk models via 
quantile regression, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29(1), pp. 150-160. 
29 
 
Gupta, A. & Liang, B. 2005, Do hedge funds have enough capital? A Value-at-risk approach, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), 219-253 
Gürtler, M., Hibbeln, M., & Vöhringer, C. 2010, Measuring concentration risk for regulatory 
purposes, The Journal of Risk, 12(3), 69-104. 
Hurlin, C. & Tokpavi, S. 2006, Backtesting value-at-risk accuracy: a simple new test, The 
Journal of Risk, 9(2), 19-37. 
Jorion, P. 2007, Value at Risk: The new benchmark for managing financial risk, 3
rd
 edition, 
New York, MaGraw-Hill.  
Kaplanski, G. & Levy, H. 2007. Basel’s value-at-risk capital requirement regulation: An 
efficiency analysis, Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(6), 1887-1906. 
Kerkhof, J. & Melenberg, B. 2004. Backtesting for risk-based regulatory capital, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 28(8), 1845-1865. 
Kerkhof, J., Melenberg, B. & Schumacher, H. 2010. Model risk and capital reserves, Journal 
of Banking Finance, 34(1), 267-279. 
Kim, Y. S., Rachev, S. T., Bianchi, M. L., Mitov, I. & Fabozzi, F. J. 2011. Time series 
analysis for financial market meltdowns, Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(8), 1879-
1891. 
Kupiec, P. 1995, Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk management models, Journal 
of Derivatives, 3(2), 73-84. 
Li, S. 2011, Exploring how ‘Smart’ the Basel II framework is in the Australian Context of 
Banking Reform, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Newcastle. 
Lucas, A. 2001, Evaluating the Basel Guidelines for Backtesting Banks’ Internal Risk 
Management Models, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33 (3), pp. 826-846. 
30 
 
McAleer, M., Jiménez-Martín, J. A. & Pérez-Amaral, T. 2012. International Evidence on 
GFC-Robust Forecasts for Risk Management under the Basel Accord, [Article in 
Press]. Journal of Forecasting. 
Obi, P., Sil, S. & C. Jeong-Gil 2010, Value-At-Risk with Time Varying Volatility in South 
African Equities, Journal of Global Business & Technology, 6 (2), pp. 1-11. 
Pérignon, C., Deng, Z. & Wang, Z. 2008, Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 32 (5), pp. 783-794. 
Pérignon, C. & Smith, D. 2010 a, Diversification and value-at-risk, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 34 (2), pp. 55-56. 
- 2010 b, The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(2), 362-377. 
Pesaran, B. & Pesaran, H. 2010, Conditional volatility and correlations of weekly returns and 
the VaR analysis of 2008 stock market crash, Economic Modelling, 27 (6), pp. 1398-
1416.  
Sjölander, P. 2009 Are the Basel II requirements justified in the presence of structural 
breaks?, Applied Financial Economics, 19(12), 985-998. 
Szegö, G. 2002, Measures of risk, Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(7), 1253-1272. 
Vlaar, P. 2000, Value at risk models for Dutch bond portfolios, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 24, pp. 1131-1154. 
Wang, J., Yeh, J. & Cheng, Y. 2011, How accurate is the square-root-of-time rule in scaling 
tail risk: A global study, Journal of Banking & Finance, 35 (5), pp. 1158-1169. 
Winker, P. & Maringer, D. 2007. The hidden risks of optimizing bond portfolios under VaR, 
The Journal of Risk, 9(4), 1-19. 
Zhao, X., Scarrott, C., Oxley, L. & Reale, M. 2010, Extreme value modelling for forecasting 
market crisis impacts, Applied Financial Economics, 20 (1-2), pp. 63-72. 
